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TORT LAW - WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS -
DAMAGES - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an
infant cannot bring an action for wrongful life, but parents of the
infant can maintain a cause of action for wrongful birth and re-
cover damages for mental distress and physical inconvenience inci-
dent to the birth.
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
Frank Speck, Jr. suffered from an inherited defect of the genes
which caused the disease neurofibromatosis. 1 After having two chil-
dren who inherited the disease, Frank and Dorothy Speck, his wife,
decided for genetic and economic reasons not to have any more
children.' Although a vasectomy was performed upon Mr. Speck
by Dr. Richard A. Finegold,5 Mrs. Speck was subsequently impreg-
nated by her husband. On December 27, 1974, Dr. Henry J.H.
Schwartz operated on Mrs. Speck to terminate her pregnancy.' Al-
though Dr. Schwartz represented to Mrs. Speck that the operation
had been successful, Mrs. Speck informed him that she thought
she was still pregnant. Thereafter, on April 29, 1975, Mrs. Speck
gave birth to Francine Speck, who was born with neuro-
fibromatosis.5
On April 9, 1976, the SpecksO brought an action in trespass and
assumpsit7 against Drs. Finegold and Schwartz in the Court of
1. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 81, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (1981) (per curiam).
Neurofibromatosis, also known as von Recklinghausen's Disease, results from a hereditary
defect attributable to an autosomal dominant gene. The disease is characterized by develop-
mental changes in the nervous system, muscles, bones and skin. Skin changes can be trivial
to extremely disfiguring. Superficially, the condition is marked by the formation of soft tu-
mors, which can also be found on cranial nerves and nerve roots. It is a congenital and
hereditofamilial condition for which there is no known treatment or cure. Id. at 81-82 n.2,
439 A.2d 112 n.2.
2. 497 Pa. at 82, 439 A.2d at 113 (Flaherty, J.).
3. Pursuant to an oral agreement entered into on April 28, 1974, Dr. Richard A. Fine-
gold, a urologist, performed a vasectomy or bilateral vas ligation upon Mr. Speck. Dr. Fine-
gold informed Mr. Speck that he was sterile and that no supplemental method of birth
control was required. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Frank Speck, Jr., Dorothy Speck, his wife, and Francine Speck, a minor, by her
parent and natural guardian, Frank Speck, sought recovery from Drs. Richard Finegold and
Henry J. H. Schwartz. Id. at 81, 439 A.2d at 112.
7. Id. The first count of the complaint was brought by Mr. and Mrs. Speck against Dr.
Finegold for the birth of their daughter, Francine. In the second count, the parents sought
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Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.8 Ruling on the
demurrers9 made by the defendants, the court held that Mr. and
Mrs. Speck could not assert claims stemming from Francine's birth
but were restricted to damages which resulted from the immediate
effects of the alleged negligence of the doctors. The court dis-
missed the claim of their daughter.10
A divided Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of
Francine's claim," but allowed that portion of the parents' claim
which sounded in tort with compensable damages for the cost of
rearing their daughter. However, the superior court denied the par-
ents' claim for damages for mental anguish, emotional distress and
physical inconvenience.12
* The parents petitioned for allowance to appeal the superior
court's dismissal of Francine's claim and disallowance of damages
on their behalf for emotional distress and physical inconvenience
stemming from Francine's birth. s The doctors cross-petitioned
from the court's allowance of the parents' tort claim. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur.14
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a per curiam opinion,
initially affirmed that portion of the superior court's order which
allowed the parents a cause of action in tort with the right to re-
cover expenses attributable to the birth and raising of their daugh-
damages from Dr. Schwartz for the birth. The third count sought damages from both doc-
tors for the birth. In the fourth count, Francine, by her father, sought recovery from both
physicians for having been born with an incurable disease. Id.
8. Id. at 77, 439 A.2d at 111. See No. 76-07,752 (C.P.) Allegheny County, Pa. filed Apr.
9, 1976).
9. For a review of the specific demurrers made by these defendants see Speck v. Fine-
gold, 124 Pittsburgh Legal J. 253 (C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. 1976), alf'd in part, rev'd in
part, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439
A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
10. 124 Pittsburgh Legal J. at 265-66.
11. 268 Pa. Super. 342, 365, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 365-66, 408 A.2d at 508-09. Judge Price, in a concurring and dissenting opin-
ion, would have disallowed damages for raising Francine, even though he saw the first two
counts as containing traditionally cognizable allegations of negligence. However, he agreed
with the disallowance of Francine's claim. Judge Spaeth, in a concurring and dissenting
opinion, agreed with those portions of the majority opinion which afforded the parents a
remedy. However, he disagreed with the denial of the parents' claim for emotional distress
and physical inconvenience attributable to Francine's birth. Id. at 367-76, 408 A.2d at 509-
14.
13. 497 Pa. at 83, 439 A.2d at 113 (Flaherty, J.).
14. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review to consider whether the
plaintiffs could recover damages for injuries incurred in the circumstances of this case. Id. at
83 n.3, 439 A.2d at 113 n.3.
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ter. ' Thereafter, the court reversed the portion of the superior
court's order which denied the parents' right to recover damages
for mental distress and physical inconvenience attributable to their
daughter's birth.16 Finally, an evenly divided court affirmed the
portion of the superior court's order which held the infant's cause
of action was not legally cognizable."
In the lead opinion, Justice Flaherty identified the two substan-
tive issues presented by the appeal: whether the court should ap-
prove the parents' cause of action brought in tort for their child's
"wrongful birth," ' and whether the court should approve the in-
fant's cause of action brought in tort for her "wrongful life."19 Jus-
tice Flaherty answered both questions affirmatively.
20
Justice Flaherty first addressed the wrongful birth cause of ac-
tion. He proposed that the action for injuries suffered as the result
of negligently performed vasectomy and abortion procedures
merely required the extension of existing principles of tort law to
new facts, specifically, alleged damages resulting from the birth of
an unplanned, genetically defective child.21 Relying on Ayala v.
15. Id. at 79, 439 A.2d at 111. Justice Flaherty filed the lead opinion in which Chief
Justice O'Brien, Justice Larsen, and Justice Kauffman joined. Justice Roberts, joined by
Chief Justice O'Brien, filed an opinion concurring in the afirmance of this portion of the
order of the superior court. Justice Kauffman concurred in the aflirmance of this portion of
the order in which Justice Larsen and Justice Flaherty joined. Justice Nix filed an opinion
which disagreed only with the recovery predicated upon the cause of action based on wrong-
ful birth. Id.
16. Id. at 80, 439 A.2d at 111-12. Justice Flaherty filed the lead opinion in which Jus-
tice Larsen and Justice Kauffman joined. Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O'Brien,
filed an opinion which concurred in the reversal of that portion of the superior court's order.
Justice Kauffman filed an opinion which concurred in the reversal of this portion of that
order, in which Justice Larsen and Justice Flaherty joined. Justice Nix filed an opinion
which disagreed only as to the recovery predicated upon a cause of action based upon
wrongful birth. Id. at 80, 439 A.2d at 112.
17. Id. Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O'Brien, filed an opinion in support of
the affirmance of the portion of the superior court's order which denied the infant's cause of
action. Justice Flaherty filed an opinion in support of a reversal of that portion of the supe-
rior court's order in which Justice Larsen and Justice Kauffman joined. Justice Kauffman
also filed an opinion in support of the reversal of the superior court's order which denied the
infant's cause of action in which Justice Larsen and Justice Flaherty joined. Id.
18. Id. at 83, 439 A.2d at 113 (Flaherty, J.). The terms "wrongful birth" and "wrongful
life" have been used interchangeably. Although Justice Flaherty generally avoided the usage
of these terms, for the purposes of this discussion, the term wrongful birth shall refer to
those actions brought by parents on their own behalf. The term wrongful life shall refer to
actions brought by children or on their behalf.




Philadelphia Board of Public Education22 for the proposition that
a person may seek redress for every substantial wrong, and a
wrongdoer is responsible for the natural and probable conse-
quences of his misconduct,2 3 Justice Flaherty reasoned that the
parents in the instant case had suffered a substantial wrong.
24
Therefore, the wrongful birth action should be permitted with the
usual principles of common law damages applied.2 5 Furthermore,
since the alleged injury - the mental distress suffered by a parent
of a defective child - was foreseeable, damages for mental distress
should also be recoverable.2 6 By determining that the parents may
bring an action under a tort theory in the circumstances of this
case, the court recognized that the defendants owed the plaintiffs a
duty of care because the plaintiffs had interests entitled to legal
protection.21 Relying on the observation of Justice Nix in Sinn v.
Burd,28 Justice Flaherty concluded that the concept of duty is re-
ally an aggregate of policy considerations leading to the conclusion
that a plaintiff is entitled to protection from the injury he has
suffered. 9
Justice Flaherty then examined the argument that no duty of
care should extend from the doctor to the patient in a case which
involves alleged damages as a result of the birth of an unplanned
child. The argument that parents should not be afforded the right
to bring an action because the public policy of the Commonwealth
favors birth over abortion"° was rejected by the court on three
22. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (doctrine of governmental immunity abolished).
23. See also Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981) (Kauffman,
J., dissenting) (court upheld constitutionality of Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, Jus-
tice Kauffman criticized resurrection of governmental immunity doctrine); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (abolished impact rule for tort recovery).
24. 497 Pa. at 84, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.).
25. Id. Because the court recognized the wrongful birth action, it did not address the
applicability of a theory of relief based on breach of contract. Id. at n.4, 439 A.2d at 114 n.4.
26. Id. at 84, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.).
27. Id. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971).
28. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). In Sinn, Justice Nix quoted Leong v. Takasaki,
55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) for the proposition that, "the concept of duty amounts
to no more than 'the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' from the harm suffered." 497 Pa. at 84,
439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.) (quoting Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 407, 520 P.2d 758,
764 (1974)).
29. 497 Pa. at 84, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.).
30. It was argued that the approval of such a cause of action contravenes legislatively
declared policy. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983), where it is
stated:
Since it is the public policy of the Commonwealth to favor childbirth over abor-
tion, no Commonwealth funds and no Federal funds which are appropriated by the
1116 Vol. 21:1113
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grounds. Initially, Justice Flaherty reasoned that because the rec-
ognition of this cause of action had no impact on whether abor-
tions are performed in the Commonwealth or not, it could not be
in conflict with a public policy which favors childbirth over abor-
tion.," Moreover, the court could not rely on the Commonwealth's
policy favoring birth over abortion to defeat the cause of action
because it conflicts with the constitutional right to seek a termina-
tion of pregnancy as recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade.3 2 Finally, Justice Flaherty concluded that if
no duty of care was imposed on these physicians and no cause of
action allowed, fundamental policies of tort law in the Common-
wealth would be frustrated. 3 Relying on the importance of the
prevention of future harm in the field of torts and the incentive to
prevent the occurrence of harm, Justice Flaherty concluded that to
deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their cause of action
would result in a windfall to the defendants.3 4
Justice Flaherty next addressed the wrongful life cause of action.
He rejected the position taken by the New York Court of Appeals
in Becker v. Schwartz3 5 which had denied the cause of action for
wrongful life.5 Justice Flaherty reasoned that the infant exper-
Commonwealth shall be expended by any State or local government agency for the
performance of abortion: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to
deny the use of funds where a physician has certified in writing that the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to full term or except for such
medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or
incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health ser-
vice. Nothing contained in this section shall be interpreted to restrict or limit in any
way, appropriations, made by the Commonwealth or a local governmental agency to
hospitals for their maintenance and operation, or, for reimbursement to hospitals for
services rendered which are not for the performance of abortions.
Id.
31. 497 Pa. at 84-85, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.).
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice Flaherty concluded that the right to terminate a preg-
nancy would be hollow if the plaintiffs were only able to seek an abortion but unable to
obtain a remedy at law for injuries resulting from the negligent performance of the abortion.
497 Pa. 85, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.).
33. 497 Pa. at 85, 439 A.2d at 114 (Flaherty, J.). Justice Flaherty noted these policies
were, "to compensate the victim, deter negligence, and encourage due care." Id. See also
Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. at 599, 305 A.2d at 884, supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
34. 497 Pa. at 85-86, 439 A.2d at 114-15 (Flaherty, J.).
35. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). The companion case of
Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub. nom. Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) had recognized a wrong-
ful life cause of action. However, the wrongful life action was denied by the New York State
Court of Appeals in Becker.
36. Justice Flaherty noted that the New York State Court of Appeals had rejected the
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ienced suffering and financial expense as the result of the negli-
gence of a third party; therefore, that suffering and expense should
be compensated.3 7 Justice Flaherty emphasized that the issue
before the court was whether the plaintiffs should be given the op-
portunity to present their claim to a trier of fact, not whether they
should be afforded damages and not whether their claims were
true."' He rejected the view that the cause of action should be de-
nied because of the inability of the court to calculate the value of
existence as compared to nonexistence.3 9 Instead, he emphasized
that a diseased plaintiff existed and, accepting the allegations of
the complaint as true, would not exist but for the negligence of the
defendants.4 Although existence is not generally characterized as
an injury, when existence is foreseeably and inextricably coupled
with a disease, Justice Flaherty concluded that it may be intolera-
bly burdensome.4 Justice Flaherty declined to judicially foreclose
consideration of whether life may be intolerably burdensome and
thus leave a deformed plaintiff without a remedy.42 Relying on the
reasoning of Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital43 Justice Flaherty
concluded that where a plaintiff has suffered a "substantial" or
"palpable" wrong, a cause of action must be granted. Since both
parents and infant had been injured, both should be afforded a
cause of action."
cause of action for two reasons, because the court had declared itself incompetent to decide
whether it is better never to have been born than to have been born with gross deficiencies,
and because the recognition of the cause of action would force the court to calculate dam-
ages based on a comparison between life in an impaired state and nonexistence. 497 Pa. at
86, 439 A.2d at 115 (Flaherty, J.).
37. Id. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (1980) (court permitted the wrongful life cause of action).
38. 497 Pa. at 86, 439 A.2d at 115 (Flaherty, J.).




43. 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965). In Flagielo, plaintiff was injured during a fall
caused by the negligence of hospital employees in an episode unrelated to the condition
which had brought her to the hospital. The court held hospitals were not immune from tort
actions brought by patients The FlagieUo reasoning was found by Justice Flaherty to be
applicable to the instant case. Specifically, Justice Flaherty relied on the proposition that:
"An injury is a wrong; and for the redress of every wrong there is a remedy: a wrong is a
violation of one's right; and for the vindication of every right there is a remedy." 497 Pa. at
88, 439 A.2d at 116 (Flaherty, J.) (quoting Flagiello, 417 Pa. at 489-90, 208 A.2d at 194-95).
44. 497 Pa. at 88, 439 A.2d at 116 (Flaherty, J.). Justice Flaherty accepted the exis-
tence of injuries because he viewed the facts well-pleaded as true as the court must do when
a demurrer has been granted below and is the subject of the review. Id.
1118
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Justice Roberts45 agreed with the superior court that the par-
ents' claim for medical expenses arising from the allegedly im-
proper operations should be allowed to proceed to trial."' Addition-
ally, Justice Roberts agreed that the infant's wrongful life claim
was properly dismissed 47 because none of the highest appellate
courts of other jurisdictions had recognized such a cause of ac-
tion.48 He also justified the dismissal of the wrongful life claim be-
cause the California intermediate appellate court's recognition of
the claim in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories49 had been
called into question by a subsequent panel of the same intermedi-
ate appellate court in Turpin v. Sortini.50 Justice Roberts also
would have permitted the appellants' claims relating to their own
pecuniary losses and emotional distress to proceed to trial.5' Jus-
tice Roberts emphasized that because this child was unhealthy and
had inherited a crippling disease, a jury question was presented as
to the extent of the net harm.2
Justice Kauffman58 identified the issue presented by the case as
merely whether one injured by the negligence of another was able
45. Chief Justice O'Brien joined in this opinion. Id. at 90, 439 A.2d at 117 (Roberts,
J.).
46. Id. at 89, 439 A.2d at 116 (Roberts, J.).
47. Id.
48. Id. See e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978), Coleman v. Garrison, 349
A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), and Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954,
182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). (Supreme Court of California recognized the wrongful life cause
of action on behalf of a defective child subsequent to the Speck decision).
49. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (California intermediate appellate
court permitted wrongful life cause of action).
50. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981) (did not permit wrongful life cause
of action), rev'd, 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (California
Supreme Court permitted the wrongful life claim).
51. 497 Pa. at 89, 439 A.2d at 116. (Roberts, J.). Justice Roberts noted the pecuniary
losses, including those flowing from the rearing of another child, were within the natural and
probable consequences of appellees' allegedly wrongful conduct and emotional distress was
also foreseeable. Id. at 89-90, 439 A.2d at 117 (Roberts, J.). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 351, 353 (1979). However, Justice Roberts indicated that the appellees should
be allowed to introduce evidence that damages which flowed from the rearing of another
child are outweighed by the benefits of joy, companionship, and affection which a child can
provide. 497 Pa. at 90, 439 A.2d at 117 (Roberts, J.). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §
920 (1977).
52. 497 Pa. at 90, 439 A.2d at 117 (Roberts, J.). Thus, Justice Roberts would modify
the order of the superior court to permit appellants' counts seeking recovery for emotional
distress and pecuniary losses to proceed to trial. Id.
53. Justices Larsen and Flaherty joined Justice Kauffman in this opinion. Id. at 93,
439 A.2d 118 (Kauffman, J.).
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to recover for the harm proximately caused." He identified as "ax-
iomatic" the proposition that a person may seek redress for every
substantial wrong and that a wrongdoer is responsible for the nat-
ural and probable consequences of his misconduct." Justice Kauff-
man noted that the medical procedures sought by Mr. and Mrs.
Speck were legal in the Commonwealth." Thus, in his opinion,
nothing concerning sterilization and abortion procedures required
the application of different legal principles from those controlling
in other medical malpractice actions.57 Since each of these doctors
entered into a lawful agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Speck, a duty
of care arose toward them.58 Justice Kauffman noted that appellate
courts of several states and the majority of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had adopted the enlightened view that parents should
be afforded a cause of action in tort when doctors negligently per-
form their lawful contractual duties in sterilization 5  and abortion"
procedures. He considered the fact that the normal remedy af-
forded a negligently injured party is to be restored to the position
54. Id. at 90, 439 A.2d at 117, (Kauffman, J.). Specifically, the Justice did not view the
case as presenting the issue of whether the public policy of Pennsylvania favors birth over
abortion. Id.
55. Id. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (permitted bystander recov-
ery of damages for emotional distress); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,
305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolished governmental immunity); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (abandoned requirement of physical impact as precondition for re-
covery of damages for fright and shock).
56. 497 Pa. at 91, 439 A.2d at 117 (Kauffman, J.). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (Texas criminal abortion laws found unconstitutional as they infringed on the right
to privacy which encompasses a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Georgia criminal abortion laws found unconstitutional as they infringed
on privacy and personal liberty rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Con-
necticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives found unconstitutional as it infringed
on right of marital privacy).
57. 497 Pa. at 91, 439 A.2d at 117 (Kauffman, J.).
58. Id. Justice Kauffman concluded that since each doctor allegedly performed this
duty negligently and allegedly damages directly resulted from this negligence, then the doc-
tors' alleged conduct would be actionable if proven at trial. Id.
59. Id. See e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(permitted award of damages to parents of a healthy child for negligently performed vasec-
tomy); Bushman v. Burns Clinical Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683
(1978) (permitted award of damages to parents of healthy child for negligently performed
tubal ligation); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (permitted award
of damages to parents of healthy child for negligently performed tubal ligation); Betancourt
v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (permitted award of
damages to parents of healthy child for negligently performed vasectomy).
60. 497 Pa. at 91, 439 A.2d at 117-18 (Kauffman, J.). See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (permitted wrongful birth action, denied wrongful life action).
Cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (New York
State Court of Appeals permitted wrongful birth action, denied wrongful life action).
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that person would have held but for the negligent conduct, and
observed that but for the alleged negligence Francine Speck would
not have been born."
Justice Kauffman also conceded that the gift of life was not a
compensable injury.62 However, relying on the fact that this child
was incurably diseased and deformed, he concluded that
Francine's life of suffering was the natural and probable conse-
quence of the appellees' misconduct.63 Therefore, Justice Kauff-
man disagreed with the majority position which denied the infant's
wrongful life action."
Justice Nix, in a dissenting opinion, identified the issues on ap-
peal from the superior court. 8 These issues questioned whether
Pennsylvania would recognize an action in negligence for a birth
that, absent the alleged negligence, would not have occurred.66 Jus-
tice Nix concluded that a review of the pleadings of record indi-
cated that alternative causes of action could provide recovery for
some or all of the damages claimed; thus, denial of the negligence
claims for wrongful birth or wrongful life would not leave the ag-
grieved parties without a remedy.
67
Justice Nix approached the problem from the premise that the
court was being asked to judicially legislate two new causes of ac-
tion which had never before existed in the Commonwealth.s He
noted that even though a birth had resulted from the negligence of
a third party, the jurisdiction had never before held that the birth
61. 497 Pa. at 92, 439 A.2d at 118 (Kauffman, J.).
62. Id.
63. Id. Justice Kauffman noted that because the demurrers were sustained by the trial
court, all facts well-pleaded in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id. at 92 n.4, 439
A.2d at 118 n.4 (Kauffman, J.).
64. Id. at 92-93, 439 A.2d. at 118 (Kauffman, J.). Justice Kauffman also noted that to
allow this child's wrong to go unredressed would provide no deterrence to professional irre-
sponsibility and would be incompatible with the Commonwealth's principles of tort liability.
He stated, "[flor the majority under these circumstances to turn their backs on this existing
child and to disregard her actual suffering and exceptional need for medical and other assis-
tance is a calloused and unjust act." Id. (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 93, 439 A.2d at 118-19, (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix identified the issues
as whether the unwanted, unplanned infant had a right to recovery for her wrongful life;
whether the parents of the infant could bring an action for that child's wrongful birth; and,
if either or both actions were recognized, the question of the damages recoverable. Id.
66. Id. at 94, 439 A.2d at 119 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix identified a supplemen-
tal issue as the measure of damage question in the event that either parents or infant were
afforded a cause of action. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Justice Nix specifically rejected the view that the court was merely being asked
to extend existing negligence principles to new facts. Id.
1983 1121
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of any human being, despite being unwanted and unplanned, con-
stituted a legal injury.69 Thus, this was not a mere extension of
existing tort principles." He also refused to limit the applicability
of the proposition to a "genetically defective" child.7 Justice Nix
identified the real question presented as whether the negligent fail-
ure to prevent the birth of an unwanted child should be compensa-
ble. Emphasizing that circumspection and prudence were the
qualities most needed in the area of judicial legislation, and also
noting that discipline must be exercised to prevent personal views
from clouding legal judgment, he concluded that a court can only
engage in judicial lawmaking when it is directed to do so by consti-
tutional mandate, by legislative direction, or when the court is ar-
ticulating public policy.7 3 Justice Nix found no constitutional man-
date which required the recognition of either cause of action.74 He
indicated that the refusal of the state to recognize the wrongful
birth action did not impede the decision of the parents to seek
sterilization as a means of contraception. Justice Nix reasoned
that the practical effect of the recognition of the wrongful birth
action would discourage practitioners from performing the proce-
dures for fear they would be inundated by such claims. 6 Justice
Nix found that it was generally the function of the legislature to
69. Id.
70. Id. See Comment, Wrongful Life: Birth Control Spawns a Tort, 13 JOHN MA-
SHALL L.R. 401 (1980); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8
ST. M AY's L.J. 140 (1977). See also Matter of Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis.2d 539,
576-77, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981).
71. 497 Pa. at 95, 439 A.2d at 119 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix refused to do this
on the basis that the defective condition of the infant was not attributable to the actions of
these doctors and because the term "genetically defective" was undefined and there was no
suggestion as to who would decide who fell into the classification. Also, Justice Nix was
reluctant to limit the proposition to a genetically defective child because historically there
have been societal attempts to control genetics for the extermination of a weaker group by a
more powerful group. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 95-96, 439 A.2d 119-20 (Nix, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 96, 439 A.2d at 120 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix concluded the refusal to
create a new tort liability did not constitute government interference with the constitution-
ally protected access to abortion as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
right to seek an abortion is not predicated upon the existence of a negligence action, nor is it
deterred by the absence of the action. 497 Pa. at 96-97, 439 A.2d at 120-21 (Nix, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Nix also found no constitutional compulsion to allow the wrongful birth claim
in order to protect the preconception decision to avoid giving birth. Id. at 97, 439 A.2d at
121 (Nix, J., dissenting).




decide what was in the public interest." Relying on Mamlin v. Ge-
noe7' he concluded that the area in which the court was free to
articulate public policy was a limited one.79 Because of the absence
of unanimity of opinion in regard to sterilization and abortion pro-
cedures and because there was a legislatively expressed policy
favoring childbirth,80 Justice Nix concluded there was an absence
of unanimity of public opinion to justify the recognition of either
cause of action.81 Because Justice Nix perceived that the function
of the court is to implement societal values rather than create
them, he concluded that the court was not free to ignore the ab-
sence of unanimity of public opinion in this area.
82
Justice Nix reasoned that the same result would occur even if he
accepted the viewpoint-that this was merely a new application of
traditional principles of negligence.8a Relying on the court's obser-
vations regarding the concept of duty in Sinn v. Burd,8 4 Justice
Nix concluded that ultimately the analytical question presented
was whether or not these plaintiffs have interests which are enti-
tled to legal protection. a Therefore, even if this were merely an
extension of traditional negligence principles, it must be evident
that the public policy to be effectuated by the recognition of these
77. Id. at 98, 439 A.2d at 121 (Nix, J., dissenting). The legislature possesses the repre-
sentative character which provides a reflection of the will of its constituency. Id.
78. 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407 (1941). Justice Nix relied on Mamlin for the notion that:
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public policy does
not extend to specific economic or social problems which are controversial in nature
and capable of solution only as a result of a study of various factors and conditions. It
is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety,
morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a
court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There must
be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the cus-
toms and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and
in the interests of the public weal. . . . Only in the clearest cases, therefore, may a
court make an alleged public policy the basis of jiidicial decision.
497 Pa. at 98, 439 A.2d at 121 (Nix, J., dissenting) (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320,
325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941)) (emphasis supplied by Speck court).
79. 497 Pa. at 99, 439 A.2d at 121 (Nix, J. dissenting).
80. The Justice noted, it is the public policy of the Commonwealth to favor childbirth
over abortion. 497 Pa. at 99 n.8., 439 A.2d at 121 n.8. (Nix, J. dissenting). See supra note 30.
81. Id. at 99, 439 A.2d at 121 (Nix, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 99, 439 A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). See supra note 28. Justice Nix also observed the
Sinn court had quoted Professor Prosser for the proposition that, "the problems [sic] of
duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has
been formulated." 497 Pa. at 100, 439 A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting). (quoting W. PROS-
SER, supra note 27, at 325).
85. 497 Pa. at 100, 439 A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting).
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causes of action conforms with the overwhelming weight of public
opinion .8  Because reasonable men disagree about the issues raised
by this case, Justice Nix concluded that the court should refrain
from making law amid this controversy.87 Justice Nix declined to
recognize either cause of action for wrongful birth or wrongful life
because the area would be best left to legislative resolution. 8
Gleitman v. Cosgrove8 9 was one of the first cases to address the
issues raised by both wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of
action emanating from the birth of a defective child. In Gleitman,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant doctors had negligently
failed to inform Mrs. Gleitman of the possible effects German mea-
sles could have on her infant during gestation. Thus, Mrs.
Gleitman claimed she was deprived of the opportunity to abort
and subsequently gave birth to an infant with substantial defects."
The New Jersey Supreme Court denied both the wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims.0 1 Addressing the wrongful life action, the
court noted that the defendants' conduct was not a cause of the
infant's defects.9 2 Thus, the infant was asserting that he should not
have been born, rather than asserting he should have been born
without defects.9 Emphasizing that the normal measure of dam-
ages in tort actions is compensatory, the Gleitman court concluded
that it was unable to measure damages because it could not mea-
sure the difference between a life with defects and nonexistence.9 4
Thus, the court held that the wrongful life action was not actiona-
ble because it did not give rise to legally cognizable damages.9 The
Gleitman court's reasoning has been described by at least one
commentator as the "unascertainable damage" rationale. 6
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Justice Nix emphasized that the pleadings indicated alternative causes of ac-
tion. Because the Specks were free to file an amended complaint, they were still able to
pursue other remedies. Thus, they would not be left without a remedy if the court declined
to create these two causes of action. Id.
89. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
90. Id. at 25-26, 227 A.2d at 690-91.
91. Id. at 29-31, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
92. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
95. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. The Gleitman court also denied the wrongful birth
action because of the difficulty in measuring damages. The court held that there were no
legally cognizable damages and even if there were, public policy considerations which pro-
moted the preciousness of human life would preclude the wrongful birth claim. Id. at 30-31,
227 A.2d at 693.
96. See Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action - Suggestions
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Thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court deemphasized the
"unascertainable damage" rationale when it again considered these
actions in Berman v. Allan.97 In Berman, plaintiffs alleged the de-
fendant obstetricians failed to inform Mrs. Berman of the risk that
a woman in her age group could give birth to a child afflicted with
Down's Syndrome. They also failed to inform Mrs. Berman of the
availability of amniocentisis to determine possible infant defects.
Subsequently, Mrs. Berman gave birth to an infant afflicted with
Down's Syndrome, or mongolism. The complaint alleged that if
Mrs. Berman had been informed of the availability of the amni-
ocentisis procedure, she would have submitted to it and had the
fetus aborted. The Berman court denied the wrongful life ac-
tion9" but permitted the wrongful birth action. 100 Discussing
wrongful life, the Berman court concluded that the difficulty in
measuring damages which had been emphasized in Gleitman was
not a primary concern. 10 1 Instead, the Berman court denied the
wrongful life action because it concluded that the infant had not
suffered any legally cognizable damages by being brought into exis-
tence.102 Emphasizing the sanctity of life, the court concluded that
life with a handicap was more precious than nonexistence.103
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Schroeder v.
Perkel."04 In Schroeder, the plaintiffs alleged negligence because
the defendant pediatricians failed to diagnose cystic fibrosis, a he-
reditary disease, in the first child born to the plaintiff parents, and
thus the parents claimed they were deprived of an informed choice
to have a second child. Because of the failure to diagnose the he-
reditary disease in the first child, Mrs. Schroeder subsequently be-
came pregnant and gave birth to a second child afflicted with cys-
for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 616 (1980).
97. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
98. Id. at 424-25, 404 A.2d at 10.
99. Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
100. Id. at 434, 404 A.2d at 14.
101. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12.
102. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
103. Id. Additionally, the Berman court permitted the wrongful birth action and
found that in light of the Roe decision, public policy supported the proposition that a wo-
man should not be impermissibly denied an opportunity to make the decision to undergo an
abortion. Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14. The Berman court concluded the physicians were
liable for damages proximately caused by their negligence in depriving Mrs. Berman of her
opportunity to abort. The court also awarded the Bermans damages for mental and emo-
tional anguish. Id. at 432-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15.
104. 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
1983 Recent Decisions 1125
Duquesne Law Review
tic fibrosis. 10 5 The sole issue before the court was whether the
appellate division had properly entered judgment for the defen-
dants on the portion of the wrongful birth claim which sought
damages for incremental medical costs incurred by the parents in
caring for their second child afflicted with cystic fibrosis. 106 The
Schroeder court held that the defendants should be held liable for
such expenses if it could be proved at trial that the defendants
deprived the parents of a right to choose whether or not to give
birth to a defective child.107 Addressing the issue of whether the
pediatricians owed a duty to the parents of their patient, the court
emphasized that in a negligence action the scope of duty extends
to the reasonably foreseeable consequence of a negligent act, ex-
cept as limited by policy considerations.10 8 Because the court pre-
viously had recognized that a wrongdoer who injures one member
of a family may indirectly injure another, 0 9 the Schroeder court
concluded that harm to the parents was foreseeable from the in-
jury to their child. Therefore, the physicians' duty extended to
these parents as members of the immediate family of their patient
who might be adversely affected by a breach of their duty."' The
Schroeder court declined to recognize claims for "wrongful life" or
"diminished parenthood," a cause of action brought by or on be-
half of an infant for the diminution in the capacity of the parents
to love and care for their child.' The court declined to recognize
these claims because the claims were not asserted on the appeal."
2
105. Id. at 57-58, 432 A.2d at 835-36.
106. Id. at 62, 432 A.2d at 838.
107. Id. at 70-71, 432 A.2d at 842.
108. Id. at 63, 432 A.2d at 838.
109. Id. at 64, 432 A.2d at 839. The court emphasized the interconnection of legal
interests in a family and stated:
The foreseeability of injury to members of a family other than one immediately
injured by the wrongdoing of another must be viewed in light of the legal relation-
ships among family members. A family is woven of the fibers of life; if one strand is
damaged, the whole structure may suffer. The filaments of family life, although indi-
vidually spun, create a web of interconnected legal interests. This Court has recog-
nized that a wrongdoer who causes a direct injury to one member of the family may
indirectly damage another.
Id. at 63-64, 432 A.2d at 839.
110. Id. at 64-65, 432 A.2d at 839.
111. Id. at 65, 432 A.2d at 840. Although the majority opinion refers to the infant's
cause of action as "diminished parenthood," Justice Handler refers to it as the "diminished"
or "wrongful" life claim. Id. at 78, 432 A.2d at 846 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 65, 432 A.2d at 840. Justice Handler, in a concurring and dissenting opin-
ion, relied on the fact that the wrongful conduct of these physicians affected the entire
family. He proposed that the child alone suffered from the impaired parental capacity
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However, dicta in the Schroeder opinion regarding family relation-
ships indicates the court may be ready to afford these infants some
form of damages."'
In Park v. Chessin"4 the New York State Appellate Division
recognized a wrongful life cause of action brought by a child af-
flicted with polycystic kidney disease.'" The Park court noted that
the right of parents not to have children extends to circumstances
in which it can be ascertained that the child would be born de-
formed."' The court found the breach of the parents' right was
also tortious to the infant's fundamental right to be born as a
whole, functional human being.117 On this basis, the Park court
recognized a cause of action for wrongful life."58 However, the Park
court's recognition of the wrongful life action was not long lived.
The Park decision was reviewed by the New York State Court of
Appeals in Becker v. Schwartz,"9 where the highest court in New
York denied the recognition of the wrongful life cause of action.
20
However, the Becker court recognized the parents' action brought
in negligence and medical malpractice.' In denying the wrongful
life action, the Becker court noted two flaws in the claim. The first
caused by the physicians' negligence. Thus, the child was also owed a duty by the physicians
because he suffered an impaired or diminished childhood or life by being born to parents
who were less fit to assume parental responsibility. The infant suffered incremental harm,
beyond its natural affliction, which affected the quality of its life. Thus, Justice Handler
would have reinstated the diminished or wrongful life claim on behalf of the infant. Id. at
72-78, 432 A.2d 843-46 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. See supra note 109.
114. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub. nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Park, after having a child born
with polycystic kidney disease, a hereditary malady, the parents sought medical advice from
the defendant obstetricians and inquired about the risk of bearing another child with the
disease. Defendants told the parents that the chance of having another child with the dis-
ease was practically nonexistent. Relying on the inaccurate medical advice, Mrs. Park be-
came pregnant and subsequently gave birth to another child afflicted with the same disease.
60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
115. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. Additionally, the Park court recognized a
cause of action in the parents in medical malpractice. Id. at 87, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
116. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). The Park case was the
companion case in Becker. In Becker, plaintiffs alleged Mrs. Becker was never advised by
the defendants of the increased risk of Down's Syndrome, or mongolism, in children born to
women in her age group, nor was she advised of the availability of amniocentisis to detect
such defects. Subsequently, she gave birth to a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Id. at
405-06, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. See supra note 114.
120. 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
121. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
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was that the infant had not suffered any legally cognizable in-
jury."'22 The court emphasized that there was no precedent for the
Park court's finding that a child had a fundamental right to be
born as a whole, functional human being.12 3 The second flaw in the
wrongful life claim related to damages. The court emphasized that
since the injured party's remedy in negligence is to be placed in
the position he would have occupied but for the negligent conduct,
in Becker, but for the defendants' negligence these infants would
never have been born." ' The Becker court concluded that the law
was not equipped to calculate damages for wrongful life by making




The California Court of Appeals recognized a wrongful life cause
of action brought by a child afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease in
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories." The Curlender court was
presented with the wrongful life issue only. The court relied on
public policy considerations and recognized the existence of a duty
from the medical laboratories which had performed the genetic
tests on the parents both to the parents and the unborn child.2 7
The Curlender court found the real problem to be whether the
breach of the duty was the proximate cause of a legally cognizable
injury. " The court also found that the injury to the child was the
birth of the child with a defect" 9 and noted that the infant both
existed and suffered due to the negligence of others. 30 Addressing
the fear that recognition of these infants' rights would inevitably
lead to infants bringing suit against their own parents for their
122. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
125. Id. The Becker court stated, "a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant
seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a com-
parison between Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence." Id. See
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
126. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). In Curlender, plaintiffs alleged
defendants negligently administered genetic tests to these parents which resulted in the
dissemination of inaccurate information to the parents regarding their status as carriers of
genes which would result in the conception and birth of a child afflicted with Tay-Sachs
disease. Parents relied upon this information either to conceive the infant, forego amni-
ocentesis or forego abortion. Subsequently, an infant was born afflicted with Tay-Sachs dis-
ease. Id. at 815-16, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
127. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The Curlender court also found that the duty
was breached. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
130. Id.
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births, the Curlender court concluded that this particular cause of
action was based upon negligent failure by those under a duty to
inform prospective parents of information necessary to make a
conscious choice not to conceive.13' However, if a case arose where
parents made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy with
full knowledge that an impaired infant would be born, the
Curlender court found no policy considerations which would pro-
tect parents from answering for the misery they may have brought
upon their offspring. " 2 Noting that there is a remedy for every
wrong, the Curlender court recognized the wrongful life cause of
action. 33
Subsequently, in Turpin v. Sortinil" another panel of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals rejected the Curlender recognition of a
wrongful life action as "unsound under established principles of
law."'' 3 However, the intermediate court decision was reviewed by
the California Supreme Court " which chose to follow Curlender
in its recognition of the wrongful life action, thereby reversing the
Turpin intermediate court decision.13 7 Only the wrongful life ac-
131. Id.
132. Id. The California Legislature quickly responded to the CurLender pronounce-
ment by enacting CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982) which provides:
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been
allowed to have been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child
shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or
refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section, "conceived" means the fertilization of a human ovum
by a human sperm.
Id.
133. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The Curlender court, addressing
the issue of the extent of the infant's recovery, rejected the notion that the wrongful life
action involved an evaluation of a right not to be born. Instead, the court found the claim as
the right of the defective child to recover damages for pain and suffering during its limited
life span and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition. Id. at 830-31,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
134. 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), rev'd, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
135. Id. at 691, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
136. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). In Turpin, the plaintiffs
alleged that a speech and hearing specialist and other hospital personnel negligently tested
Hope Turpin, a first child, and advised the family pediatrician that Hope's hearing was
normal. In fact, Hope suffered from a hereditary ailment which left her completely deaf.
Relying on the defendants' inaccurate diagnosis, these parents conceived a second child,
who also suffered from total deafness. The parents alleged that they would not have con-
ceived a second child if they had been cognizant of their first child's hereditary defect. Id. at
223-24, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
137. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
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tion brought on behalf of the Turpins' second deaf child was
before the court. 8  The court held the child in a wrongful life ac-
tion could not recover damages for pain and suffering or any other
general damages"" for being born impaired in contrast to not being
born at all, but could recover special damages, as could her par-
ents, for extraordinary expenses necessary in order to treat her he-
reditary defect.'" The Turpin court noted that regardless of the
label wrongful life, this action was one form of the traditional med-
ical malpractice action.'' The court recognized that the defen-
dants' immediate patient was the Turpins' first child, and that the
present wrongful life action was brought by the second child. How-
ever, the Turpin court found that the defendants still owed a duty
of care to these parents and their potential offspring because it was
reasonably foreseeable that they would be directly affected by the
defendants' negligent failure to discover the existence of a heredi-
tary ailment in the Turpins' first child. 42
The Turpin court also addressed the defendants' argument that
the Turpins' second child had not suffered any legally cognizable
injury or rationally ascertainable damage as a result of the alleged
negligence.14 3 The court noted a flaw in the Curlender analysis be-
cause the Curlender court had failed to distinguish between an or-
138. Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
139. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal.- Rptr. at 349. The second child, Joy Turpin,
sought:
(1) general damages for being 'deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born
as a whole, functional human being without total deafness' and (2) special damages
for the 'extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training and hearing equip-
ment' which she will incur during her lifetime as a result of her hearing impairment.
Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
140. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
141. Id. at 229, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342. The court observed that the
elements of a cause of action for professional negligence are:
(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other
members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.
Id. at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting Budd v. Nixen 6 Cal. 3d 195,
200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971)).
142. 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343. Cf. Schroeder v. Perkel,
87 N.J. at 63-65, 432 A.2d at 838-40. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08. The Tur-
pin court noted that the defendants did not argue that they owed no duty of care to the
second child, nor did they challenge the existence of a breach of duty or the fact that the
second child's birth was the proximate result of their negligence. 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d
at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
143. 31 Cal. 3d at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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dinary prenatal injury and an injury in a wrongful life case."" The
Turpin court concluded that it would be inconsistent with basic
tort principles to view the injury to the second child solely by re-
ferring to its present condition without considering the fact that if
the defendants had not been negligent, the child would not have
been born at all. 1" 5 The court did not disallow the wrongful life
action but denied the infant's recovery of general damages, 146 re-
jecting the Berman rationale that the value of impaired life always
exceeds the value of nonlife.1 47 Instead, the court found it impossi-
ble to determine whether the infant had suffered an injury because
she was born impaired rather than not having been born at all, and
even if it could make this determination, it would be impossible to
assess general damages.148 In contrast to its denial of general dam-
ages for wrongful life, the court reasoned that it was illogical to
allow the parents to recover medical expenses but to deny them to
the infant, and thus the court awarded the child special damages
for extraordinary expenses necessary to treat her hereditary
ailment."
49
Today, courts willingly embrace the wrongful birth cause of ac-
tion. 150 Therefore, the Speck decision is clearly consistent with the
weight of authority in its recognition of this cause of action. Fur-
thermore, the Speck court's allowance of the parents' recovery of
damages for mental distress is consistent with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's granting of such damages in Sinn v. Burd.
15
1
144. Id. at 231, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. See generally Robertson, To-
ward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries,
Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1439-57.
145. 31 Cal. 3d at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
146. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
147. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
148. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (disallowed wrongful life claim be-
cause of absence of legally cognizable injury and inability to assess damages).
149. 31 Cal. 3d at 238-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
150. See e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (wrongful birth
action permitted parents to recover incremental medical costs associated with raising second
child); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (permitted parents wrongful birth
action, denied child's wrongful life action); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (permitted parents' wrongful birth action, denied child's
wrongful life action); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (wrongful birth action
permitted recovery of expenses reasonably necessary for care and treatment of impaired
child); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (permitted
parents' wrongful birth action, denied child's wrongful life action).
151. 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). In Sinn, a mother viewed her child being struck
and killed by an automobile. The mother, who was outside the zone of danger, sought dam-
ages for emotional distress which she allegedly suffered. The Sinn court abolished the zone
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However, with the exception of Turpin, which was decided subse-
quent to Speck, no final state appellate court has recognized a
cause of action for wrongful life.1 2 Thus, with respect to this cause
of action, the Speck decision is also consistent with the current
weight of authority.
Although most courts confronted with the issue have denied the
wrongful life action, they have struggled for an appropriate ration-
ale to do so. 15 3 Moreover, a consistent rationale has not been ap-
plied among the various courts which have denied these actions. 54
The difficulty in formulating an appropriate rationale for permit-
ting or denying the wrongful life action is also apparent in the
Speck decision, as evidenced by the conflicting opinions.
In Speck, the Justices expressed different policy considerations
which precluded the wrongful life action. Justice Roberts and
Chief Justice O'Brien relied on the fact that no other final appel-
late court had recognized the wrongful life claim.155 However, lack
of judicial precedent is no longer as tenable a position in light of
the subsequent recognition of the wrongful life action by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Turpin. In contrast, Justice Nix con-
cluded that both causes of action, wrongful birth and wrongful life,
were best left to legislative resolution.156 Thus, even among the
members of the Speck court who concluded that the wrongful life
action should be denied, there was little agreement as to the ap-
propriate rationale to be utilized by the court to deny the action.
.Justices Flaherty, Kauffman, and Larsen would have permitted
of danger requirement and held that the mother's count for emotional distress stated a
cause of action for which relief could be granted because emotional distress incurred by the
mother was a reasonably foreseeable injury. Id.
In Speck, because the parents sought the services of both defendants to prevent the
birth of the infant, it is apparent that the parents' emotional distress resulting from the
birth of the child was a reasonably foreseeable injury to them. See also 18 DuQ. L. REV. 1009
(1980).
152. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. However, two intermediate state ap-
pellate courts have recognized a wrongful life cause of action. See Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub. nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
153. See Comment, supra note 96, at 612-21.
154. Compare, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (wrongful life
action denied due to inability to calculate damages) with, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (wrongful life action denied due to nonexis-
tence of legally cognizable injury and inability to assess damages) [and] Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (wrongful life action denied due to nonexistence of damages).
155. 497 Pa. at 89, 439 A.2d at 116 (Roberts, J.).
156. Id. at 100, 439 A.2d at 122 (Nix, J., dissenting).
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the wrongful life claim." 7 In contrast to the Justices who denied
the claim, these Justices would have applied a traditional negli-
gence analysis to the wrongful life action. As Justice Flaherty con-
cluded, the question before the court was only whether the plain-
tiffs should be given the opportunity to present their claims to a
trier of fact, not whether they should be awarded damages, and not
whether their claims were true.1" Given the procedural posture of
the case,159 and because the infant's pleadings alleged the elements
of a negligence action, 110 the court should have viewed the facts
well-pleaded as true. If the court had done so, then the wrongful
life action should have proceeded to the trier of fact. Despite the
fact that Justice Nix specifically declined to analyze this action as.
a typical negligence action, and Justice Roberts and Chief Justice
O'Brien did not commit themselves to any particular analysis,
wrongful life claims are brought in negligence and should be ana-
lyzed as such, as numerous commentators have suggested.1 61 More-
157. Id. at 81-93, 439 A.2d 112-16 (Flaherty, J.).
158. Id. at 86, 439 A.2d at 115 (Flaherty, J.).
159. Since a demurrer had been granted below and was the subject of review, the facts
well-pleaded were to be viewed as true. Id. at 88, 439 A.2d at -116.
160. Generally, the elements of negligence actions are, duty, breach, causation, and
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1963-64); W. PROSSER, supra note 27,
at 143-45.
161. See Comment, "Wrongful Life". Should The Cause of Action Be Recognized? 70
Ky. L.J. 163 (1981-82); Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing The Defective Child's
Right To a Cause of Action, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 857 (1980); Peters and Peters reasoned,
[T]he trier of fact and not the court should determine the existence or nonexistence
of damages. This is especially true where, as in causes of action such as wrongful life,
the finding of damage depends on the resolution of moral, religious and quality of life
determinations that can only be made by the jury. Indeed, it increasingly appears
that the wrongful life cause of action, and particularly the question of damage, is not
a question of law, but rather is a question of fact that should be submitted to the
jury. Although, as suggested by the New York Court of Appeals, legislatures are capa-
ble of making this determination, legislators have demonstrated an unwillingness to
address controversial moral issues (e.g., abortion). Therefore, the only alternative is
to have juries proclaim the societal values that should prevail. This would ensure that
both the plaintiff's and defendant's interests are protected by an adversarial process
in which the evidence and interests of the parties are weighed by the jury. Ironically,
whether wrongful life and the issue of damages are legal or factual questions is, in the
long term, a moot issue. As the zeitgeist changes, the attitudes of judges will change
so that today's judge deciding wrongful life as a question of law on the basis of his
values will tomorrow view that question as an issue of fact, appropriate for resolution
by the jury. Unfortunately, this approach denies the defective child his day in court
today, as a matter of the law.
• ..It has been established that duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and dam-
ages may exist in any given case and, therefore, the jury should be given the opportu-
nity to make determinations of liability according to each factual setting.
Id. at 869-70 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, "Wrongful Life". The Right Not To
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over, in recent cases including Becker, Berman, Curlender, and
Turpin, courts have analyzed the wrongful life claim as a negli-
gence action.
The Becker court explicitly analyzed the wrongful life actions as
negligence actions.1 62 Assuming the existence of duty, breach, and
proximate causation of the infants' birth, the court concluded that
the infants had not suffered any legally cognizable injury' 63 and
concluded that the law was not equipped to calculate these dam-
ages."" The Berman court also employed a negligence analysis and
denied the claim because the infant had not suffered any legally
cognizable damage by being brought into existence.16 Both the
Becker and Berman courts applied negligence concepts to the
wrongful life actions and declined to recognize the actions. How-
ever, both cases have been criticized because the courts decided
issues which would have been more appropriately decided by a
trier of fact.166
More recently, the Turpin court addressed the argument that
the infant bringing a wrongful life claim had suffered no legally
cognizable injury or rationally ascertainable damages."6 7 The Tur-
pin court asserted that the wrongful life claim was merely one
form of the familiar' medical malpractice action. 168 In contrast to
Becker, which found no injury, the Turpin court identified the
Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480 (1980); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": [A
Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REv. 58 (1970).
162. 46 N.Y.2d at 410, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
163. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
164. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. However, the inability to
precisely ascertain damages should not deter recognition of a cause of action. The United
States Supreme Court has stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles
of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be
determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the
extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the re-
sult be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot
be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case,
which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). See also
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. at 93 n.5, 439 A.2d at 118 n.5 (Kauffman, J., concurring).
165. 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
166. Peters & Peters, supra note 161, at 868-70 (wrongful life actions should be ana-
lyzed as traditional negligence actions, juries should determine liability). See also, Note, A
Reassessment of "Wrongful Life" and "Wrongful Birth", 1980 Wis. L. REv. 782, 791 (1980).
167. 31 Cal. 3d at 229, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
168. Id. at 229, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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threshold question presented by the wrongful life cause of action
to be the determination of whether the infant had been injured by
being born with an ailment as opposed to not being born at all.19
The Turpin court examined the difficulty in determining whether
injury to the infant existed or not and denied the award of general
damages but awarded the infant special damages for extraordinary
expenses to treat the hereditary ailment.1 70 Both the Becker and
Turpin courts analyzed the wrongful life action as a negligence ac-
tion. In contrast to other recent wrongful life cases, the members
of the Speck court could not even agree to employ this form of
analysis in reviewing the wrongful life claim. The Speck court
never focused on the injury aspect of the claim, and thus avoided
grappling with the most controversial issue presented by the
wrongful life action.
In recent years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has generally
expanded tort liability in the Commonwealth in a variety of con-
texts.17 1 Thus, the Speck court's denial of the wrongful life action
is a departure from this course of expansion of tort recovery in the
Commonwealth and inconsistent with general principles of tort law
as enunciated by the court in other tort decisions.17 2 The Common-
wealth's policy to compensate, as illustrated by other tort cases,
outweighs the policies enunciated by those members of the Speck
court who denied the wrongful life claim.17
The Speck court was evenly divided on the wrongful life issue,
but more significantly, the justices did not agree on the fundamen-
tal characterization of the wrongful life claim. Since wrongful life
169. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
170. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
171. See e.g., Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (permitted bystander
recovery of damages for emotional distress, abolished zone of danger requirement); Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abolished governmental
immunity); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (abolished
charitable immunity).
172. See supra notes 22, 23, 33, 43, 64, and accompanying text. The reasoning of the
court in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979), is applicable to this wrongful life
action also. In permitting a mother outside the zone of danger to bring an action to recover
damages for negligently inflicted mental trauma, the Sinn court stated:
Regardless of whether Mrs. Sinn will be ultimately successful in recovering the dam-
ages she sustained, we believe the gravity of appellant's injury and the inherent hu-
manitarianism of our judicial process and its responsiveness to the current needs of
justice dictate that appellant be afforded a chance to present [her] case to a jury and
perhaps be compensated for the injury [she] has incurred.
Id. at 173-74, 404 A.2d at 686 (quoting Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 404, 261 A.2d 84,
85 (1970)) (emphasis in original).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
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cases vary factually, '7 and because recent wrongful life decisions
have employed negligence concepts to analyze wrongful life claims,
the Speck court could have recognized the cause of action on this
basis and allowed the suit to proceed to the trier of fact. With the
increase in the availability of genetic counseling7 5 and perform-
ance of sterilization and abortion procedures, litigation emanating
from these activities will undoubtedly increase in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere. Since subsequent to Speck the California Supreme
Court in Turpin recognized the wrongful life action and because
dicta in Schroeder17 indicates that the New Jersey Supreme Court
may be on the verge of affording infants at least some form of re-
covery for claims arising from these activities, the debate regarding
this controversial cause of action will not subside in Pennsylvania.
If in the future the members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
can agree to apply a negligence analysis to the wrongful life claim,
then ultimately the cause of action will be permitted to proceed to
the trier of fact to ascertain whether the claim is true and deter-
mine whether damages should be awarded.
Margaret M. Boldt
174. Compare, Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (per curiam) (failed
sterilization and abortion procedures) with, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (inaccurate genetic testing).
175. See generally, Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
618 (1979); Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequdte Genetic Counseling, 87 YAL L.J. 1488 (1978).
176. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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